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Abstract
In order to understand strategic interactions among firms, we often need to estimate
the parameters of static discrete games with complete information. This class of games
is difficult to estimate because the possibility of multiple equilibria invalidates the use of
methods such as MLE and GMM. We propose a two-step estimator to get around the issue
of multiple equilibria by exploiting the fact that all of the Nash equilibria are contained
in the set of correlated equilibria. In the first step, we estimate the conditional choice
probabilities by which each possible outcome is realized. In the second step, we obtain the
bounds on estimates of the parameters by minimizing the average distance between the set
of correlated equilibria and the probability distribution that we obtained in the first step.
Compared to previous approaches through which the issue of multiple equilibria has been
tackled, our method has two important advantages. First, it explicitly takes into account
the existence of mixed strategy equilibria. Second, it is computationally easy to implement:
due to the inherent linearity of correlated equilibria, we can obtain the bounds estimates
by solving a series of linear programming problems.
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Lones Smith for their insightful comments. I have also benefited from conversations with seminar participants
in the Applied Micro Student Workshop and Econometrics Reading Group at Michigan. All remaining errors
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1 Introduction
The structural estimation of games has recently gained much attention in the empirical In-
dustrial Organization literature, because many markets typically involve strategic interactions
among firms. In order to make inferences about the fundamental parameters that govern these
strategic interactions, researchers often need to econometrically model such interactions as
games and then conduct the structural estimation of the payoff functions of these games. A
simple class of games that is very useful for econometrically modeling and estimating firms’
strategic interactions is the group of static discrete games with complete information. Exam-
ples of such games include those that involve entry decisions (Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990, 1991;
Ciliberto and Tamer, 2006), labor force participation (Bjorn and Vuong, 1984), and network
effects (Ackerberg and Gowrisankaran, 2006).
In this paper, we provide a method for making inferences about the payoff functions of simul-
taneous games with complete information and a discrete strategy space. Although they are
conceptually straightforward and can be used to model many types of strategic interactions
among firms, such games pose nontrivial challenges for identification and estimation. One
challenge is that such games often have multiple equilibria, which means that the likelihood
function of the observed data is not well defined, rendering the maximum likelihood approach
invalid. Furthermore, unlike the complete-information static games with a continuous strategy
space, where all the equilibria must satisfy some first order conditions from which one can form
moment conditions and apply the GMM approach, there are no analogous first order conditions
that incorporate all the equilibria for a static discrete game having multiple equilibria. The
other challenge is on the computational front. It is well known that finding all the equilibria of
a game having nontrivial scale—which is often the case in empirical applications—is computa-
tionally infeasible. Consequently, any inferential approach that involves explicitly solving for
the equilibria of a game is computationally burdensome. The method we propose here is an
attempt to make inferences about the payoff structures while explicitly addressing the above
difficulties.
The basic idea of our approach is to exploit the relationship between the Nash equilibria and
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correlated equilibria of static discrete games with complete information. A static discrete
game with complete information can be expanded by allowing the players to communicate
with each other. The set of correlated equilibria of the original game is then defined as the set
of all Nash equilibria of the expanded game. Since strategic independence is a special form
of communication among players, the set of Nash equilibria of a static game with complete
information is contained in the set of correlated equilibria of this game. Thus, all the Nash
equilibria of a game must satisfy whatever restrictions that are satisfied by the correlated
equilibria. This insight forms the basis for our estimator of static discrete games with complete
information.
Our estimator is composed of two steps. In the first step we estimate the conditional choice
probabilities by which each possible outcome is realized by parametrically or semiparametri-
cally regressing the observed outcomes on the covariates. In the second step we exploit the
relationship between the Nash and correlated equilibria to obtain the confidence regions for the
parameters in the payoff functions. Heuristically, this second step goes as follows. We know
that the set of correlated equilibria is defined by a system of linear inequalities. Therefore,
the conditional choice probabilities that we obtain in the first step must also satisfy this sys-
tem of linear inequalities. We then obtain the parameter estimates by minimizing the average
distance (with a metric to be stated more precisely in the section on estimation) between the
set of correlated equilibria and the probability distribution that we have obtained in the first
step. Depending on whether the model is completely or partially identified, our second stage
yields point or set estimates, respectively. For completely identified models, our estimator is
consistent and asymptotically normal. For partially identified models, we first obtain the set
estimates following a similar procedure as in Manski and Tamer (2002), and then apply the
method developed in Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2005) to form the confidence regions
for the parameters of interest.
Our paper belongs to a small yet growing literature on estimating static discrete games with
complete information. Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), who first explicitly addressed the
issue of multiple equilibria, sought to find the common features among all the equilibria and
formed the likelihood function based on the observed common features. Their approach, how-
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ever, does not allow for mixed strategy equilibria and requires the computation of multi-
dimensional integrals, the dimensions of which grow quickly as the number of players and/or
actions increases, thus making them difficult to implement numerically. In a recent paper,
Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2006) explicitly modeled the equilibrium selection mechanism and
used MLE to estimate both the parameters in the payoff function and those in the equilibrium
selection equation. Their estimator is efficient and is most suitable for games of modest size,
since it requires one to find all the possible equilibria (both pure and mixed). Ciliberto and
Tamer (2006) is the closest to our paper. They also used a two-step estimator with the first
step being the same as ours. In the second step, they formed the lower and upper bounds for
the conditional choice probabilities based on the predictions of the model. They then mini-
mized the distance between the choice probabilities obtained in the first step and the set of
predicted choice probabilities determined by the lower and upper bounds. Their method is
based solely on pure strategy equilibria.
Compared to previous approaches to solving the problem of multiple equilibria, our method
has several desirable properties, both conceptually and computationally. First, the inequality
restrictions on which our estimator is based have a rigorous theoretical foundation and are
mathematically easy to characterize. These restrictions are robust to the “true” equilibrium-
selection mechanism that underlies the data generating process, and more importantly, can
accommodate the possibility that the observed outcomes are generated by different equilibria
across different observation units. Second, our method allows both pure strategy and mixed
strategy equilibria. Ruling out mixed strategy equilibria can cause bias in interpreting the
observed outcomes. Third, our method is computationally easy to implement. The metric we
use to measure the distance between the estimated choice probability and the set of predicted
choice probabilities that satisfy the restrictions imposed by correlated equilibria is defined
in a specific way so that the sample objective function is piecewise linear and convex. As
a consequence, we can use linear programming to obtain the set estimates and confidence
regions in the second step. This feature is especially desirable when the game has many players
and/or actions. Fourth, given the number of parameters, our estimator provides tighter bounds
estimates for games with a larger scale without substantially increasing the computational
burden. This is due to the fact that the number of inequality restrictions increases polynomially
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when the scale of the game becomes large. Hence, the bounds estimates are potentially tighter
for games with larger scale, as long as we have enough data to estimate consistently the
conditional choice probabilities in the first stage.
Our method, however, also has a weakness. In some situations, the set of correlated equilibria
of a game can be quite large. Hence, the incentive constraints imposed by correlated equilibria
might not be restrictive enough. As a consequence, the bounds estimates and confidence
regions might be uninformative. Nonetheless, despite this weakness, we believe that our method
provides a new and tractable framework for estimating static discrete games with complete
information.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the econometric
model for static discrete games of complete information. Section 3 introduces the main ideas of
imposing restrictions based on correlated equilibria. Section 4 defines the distance metric used
in the estimator. Section 5 presents in detail the estimation procedure. Section 6 gives Monte
Carlo evidence on how the estimator performs. Section 7 provides extension and concluding
remarks. The proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Econometric Modeling of Static Discrete Games with Com-
plete Information
2.1 Model Setup
In this section we set up the econometric model of a static discrete game with complete
information. Let I denote the set of players, each of which has a vector of covariates Xi
∈ RK representing player i′s characteristics. We allow Xi to possibly overlap with Xj for
i 6= j. For example, in the entry game that we will look at in the next subsection, the common
market conditions are part of Xi for ∀i ∈ I. We denote X ≡ ∪i∈IXi as the set of all the
covariates for the players, which has distribution FX and support SX . Let Ai denote the set
of actions available to player i and ai stand for a generic action that could be taken by player
i. Furthermore, ²i = [²i (ai)]ai∈Aidenotes the vector of payoff shocks for player i. Finally, let
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a ≡ (a1, ..., a‖I‖) denote a generic element in the set of all possible action profiles, A ≡ ×i∈IAi.
In the following sections of the paper, we will sometimes term an action profile a as an outcome1
of the game. Since the number of action profiles is finite, i.e., ‖A‖ <∞, we can enumerate all
of the possible action profiles as 1, 2, ..., l, ..., ‖A‖. We let a(l) =
[
a
(l)
i
]
i∈I
denote the lth profile
of actions in set A.
Player i′s payoff function ui (·) is given as:
ui (a,Xi, θ, ²i) = fi (a,Xi, θ) + ²i (ai) , (1)
where θ ∈ RJ is the vector of parameters to be estimated. In the above payoff specification,
the deterministic part is a function of the strategy profile, a, i′s characteristics, Xi, and the
parameter vector, θ; the preference shock is assumed to depend only on i′s own strategy, ai. In
most empirical applications (see, for example, Bresnahan and Reiss, 1990, 1991; Ciliberto and
Tamer, 2006), fi (a,Xi, θ) is assumed to be linear in θ due to its tractability. Note that our
specification can accommodate the observed heterogeneity, since the term of characteristics,
Xi, is player specific. Our specification is similar to that in Berry (1992) and Ciliberto and
Tamer (2006) in this regard, and more general than that in Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991)
and Mazzeo (2002).
We assume that the entire structure of the game is common knowledge among the players.
That is, each player’s characteristics and preference shock vector, ²i ≡ (²i (1) , ..., ²i (‖Ai‖)),
as well as the parameter vector, θ, the functional form, fi (·), are common knowledge among
all the players. Furthermore, we assume ²i (ai) is i.i.d. across i and ai, and has distribution
function G (·) and support S². As we will discuss below, the econometrician cannot observe
the realization of ²i despite his perfect knowledge of its distribution. Note here that we assume
²i (ai) depends only on player i′s own strategy, but not on other players’ strategies. Hence, this
assumption says that the random vector ²i is an inherent attribute of player i and does not
vary with respect to the strategies that might be taken by the other players. Many applications
coincide with this assumption. For instance, in Seim (2001), the profitability shock depends
solely upon a video store’s own choice of location. In contrast, Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2006)
consider a more general specification, where the preference shock depends not only on a player’s
1The term outcome is sometimes used in a slightly different way to refer to the realized payoffs of the players.
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own strategy, but also on the opponents’ strategies. However, our specification is rich enough
to capture the strategic interaction among the players, yet still make the computation remain
tractable.
We denote the parameterized game we are considering as Γ (X, θ, ²). Player i′s strategy in
Γ (X, θ, ²) is a probability distribution σi = (σi (ai))ai∈Ai ∈ 4 (Ai), where σi (ai) is player i′s
probability of choosing action ai, and 4 (Ai) denotes the set of all probability distributions
over Ai. Since each player’s action set Ai is finite, σi is a probability vector, each element
of which corresponds to the probability of choosing a certain action. Throughout the paper,
we will assume that the players’ behavior accords with the Nash equilibrium. Due to the
complete information assumption, the equilibrium strategies not only depend on a player’s
own econometric error, but also on the errors of all the other players. This fact makes the
estimation of θ a much more difficult problem than it would otherwise be if the ²′is were
private information among the players (Bajari, Hong and Ryan, 2006). In the next subsection,
we present the simple 2× 2 entry game as an example to illustrate the econometric modeling
of static discrete games of complete information.
2.2 Example: Simultaneous Entry Game
Two firms consider whether or not to enter a market. Each of the two firms i ∈ {1, 2} has to
choose an action ai ∈ {1, 0} ≡ Ai, where ai = 1 denotes that i chooses “enter” and ai = 0
means that i chooses “not enter.” We normalize each firm’s deterministic payoff to be zero
if it chooses not to enter. We include market and firm specific characteristics Xi in firm i′s
profit functions in order to capture the impact of these variables on its profits. Furthermore,
we include a spillover effect measuring the impact of a firm’s entry decision on the other firms’
profits. We can write firm i′s payoff function as follows:
ui (a,Xi, θ, ²i) = [Xi · β − δ · 1 {a−i = 1}+ ²i (ai)] · 1 {ai = 1} ,
where 1 {·} is an indicator function. The parameter vector is θ = (β, δ), where β captures the
effects of the covariates on the profits and δ measures the spillover effect of entry between the
firms. We expect δ > 0. Finally, we can represent this entry game using the following matrix
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form:
Enter Not Enter
Enter X1 · β − δ + ²1 (1) , X2 · β − δ + ²2 (1) X1 · β + ²1 (1) , 0
Not Enter 0, X2 · β + ²2 (1) 0, 0
Intuitively, corresponding to each realization of X = (X1, X2) and of ² = (²1, ²2) we have
a payoff matrix that describes the strategic interactions between the firms. In the following
section, we will also use this simple example to illustrate the incentive restrictions imposed by
a correlated equilibrium.
2.3 Formulation of the Inferential Problem
To formally describe the inferential problem facing the econometrician, let µ : SX ×Θ× S² →
4 (A) be an equilibrium function such that for each (x, θ, ²) ∈ SX ×Θ×S², µ (x, θ, ²) ∈ 4 (A)
is an equilibrium of Γ (x, θ, ²). Furthermore, let U : SX × Θ × S² ⇒ 4 (A) be an equilibrium
correspondence such that for each (x, θ, ²) ∈ SX × Θ × S², U (x, θ, ²) ⊆ 4 (A) constitutes all
the equilibria of Γ (x, θ, ²). Finally, denote by µ ∈ U if µ (x, θ, ²) ∈ U (x, θ, ²), ∀ (x, θ, ²) ∈
SX × Θ × S². That is, we say that an equilibrium function µ belongs to an an equilibrium
correspondence U if and only if the graph of µ is contained in the graph of U .
For the inferential problem, the econometrician has access to cross-sectional data {xn}Nn=1,
which are realizations of an i.i.d. sample of covariates {Xn}Nn=1 with each Xn being drawn
independently from the same distribution FX (·). For each observation unit n, she also ob-
serves an, an action profile generated by an equilibrium of the game Γ (xn, θ, ²n), whose payoff
structure is specified as in (1). Furthermore, let {λn}Nn=1be the true equilibrium selection
mechanism, where for each observation unit n, λn is a probability distribution over the cor-
respondence U , such that an equilibrium function µ ∈ U is chosen with probability λn (µ).
Suppose an equilibrium function µn ∈ U is selected for observation unit n, then an outcome
an of the game Γ (xn, θ, ²n) will be realized according to the equilibrium µn (xn, θ, ²n). Due to
the multiplicity of equilibria, the probability distribution λn over U is non-degenerate. The
objective of the econometrician is to use the data {xn, an}Nn=1 as well as the model to make
inferences about the structural parameter θ.
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If the econometrician knew the true equilibrium selection mechanism {λn}Nn=1, the multiplicity
of equilibria would not cause any difficulty for making inferences about θ, since the likelihood
of the data would still be well defined and the maximum likelihood approach could still be used
to estimate θ.2 To get around the issue that the true equilibrium selection mechanism is in fact
unknown to the econometrician, Bajari, Hong and Ryan (2006) assume λn takes a parametric
form, which enables them to form the likelihood function of the observed data and apply MLE
to estimate both the structural parameter θ and the parameters in the equilibrium selection
mechanism. As will become clear, our estimation approach does not impose any parametric
or nonparametric assumption on λn, except that the true equilibrium selection mechanism is
the same across different observations. That is, we assume λn ≡ λ,∀n, but do not impose any
structure on λ. To put it intuitively, we allow different equilibria to “bounce around” in the
data but follow the same pattern across different observations.
3 Inference via Correlated Equilibrium: The Main Ideas
In this section we formally introduce our approach to estimating static discrete games with
complete information. We provide the general framework here and will discuss the implemen-
tation of our ideas in the next two sections.
The basic idea of the estimator we propose is based on the following insight of Bresnahan
and Reiss (1990, 1991) and Tamer (2003): in games with multiple equilibria, theory provides
inequality restrictions on the probabilities that certain outcomes can occur. To understand
this point, let us consider the discrete choice models (logit models, for example). In these
models, theory provides an exact prediction of the probabilities of the outcomes, namely, the
choice probabilities. This observation carries over to the games with unique equilibrium, where
2To see this, note that under the equilibrium selection mechanism {λn}Nn=1, the log likelihood of observing
the data {an, xn}Nn=1 is:
£ =
NX
n=1
log [Pr (an|xn, θ)] +
NX
n=1
log [fX (x
n)] ,
where
Pr (an|xn, θ) =
Z
U
Z
S²
[µ (xn, θ, ²) (an)]P (d²)
ﬀ
λn (dµ) .
8
theory provides a unique prediction of the choice probabilities as well. However, in games with
multiple equilibria, the uniqueness of the choice probabilities breaks down. Nevertheless, as
Tamer (2003) argues, equilibrium theory can still provide the lower and upper bounds on the
choice probabilities. He then uses these inequality restrictions on regressions to find the regions
in which the parameters of interest lie.
Our approach is similar to Ciliberto and Tamer (2006) in that we also seek to put restrictions
on the choice probabilities using theoretical predictions of the model. However, Ciliberto and
Tamer’s (2006) approach considers pure strategy equilibria only, which makes the lower and
upper bounds problematic for the games with no pure strategy equilibria. Furthermore, their
method relies on simulation to find the lower and upper bounds, which is computationally
difficult for games with many players and/or many strategies. The method we develop here
exploits the relationship between the Nash equilibrium and correlated equilibrium to impose
restrictions on the choice probabilities. Roughly, theory says that all the Nash equilibria of a
game must be contained in the set of correlated equilibria of that game. Hence, even though a
game might have multiple equilibria, all of them must satisfy whatever conditions a correlated
equilibrium satisfies. Furthermore, the restrictions we impose apply to both pure and mixed
strategy equilibria. Before we use this relationship to derive our theoretical restrictions, we
give a brief review of the solution concept of correlated equilibria.
3.1 Correlated Equilibria of Static Discrete Games with Complete Infor-
mation
In this subsection we give a brief presentation of the concept of correlated equilibria for static
discrete games of complete information. A probability distribution µ = (µ (a))a∈A ∈ 4 (A),
where µ (a) denotes the probability that a profile of actions a is chosen, is a correlated equilib-
rium if and only if
∑
a−i∈A−i
µ (a) [ui (a−i, ai)− ui (a−i, di)] ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,∀ai ∈ Ai,∀di ∈ Ai. (2)
First, note that there are a total of
∑
i∈I ‖Ai‖ · (‖Ai‖ − 1) inequalities, all of which are linear
in the payoffs. This fact will facilitate the application of linear programming in the estimation.
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Second, to understand this definition, imagine a mediator who randomly draws an action
profile, a, from the set A with probability µ (a). The mediator then tells each player privately
to play the action as specified in the action profile a. Based on the probability distribution
µ and the instruction given to him, the player can calculate his expected payoff from obeying
or disobeying the instruction. Hence, a correlated equilibrium is defined as a probability
distribution such that no player has an incentive to deviate from the instruction given to him.
The following theorem characterizes the relationship between the correlated and Nash equilibria
of a strategic-form game.
Theorem 1 Given any finite strategic-form game Γ, suppose σ = (σi)i∈I is a Nash equilibrium
of Γ, where σi = (σi (ai))ai∈Ai ∈ 4 (Ai) denotes the probability distribution according to which
player i chooses an action from Ai. Define the probability distribution µ = (µ (a))a∈A ∈ 4 (A)
where µ (a) =
∏
i∈I
σi (ai), then µ is a correlated equilibrium of Γ.
This theorem suggests that a Nash equilibrium of the original game without communication
remains a Nash equilibrium of the augmented game where players are allowed to communicate
with each other. The proof can be found in any standard advanced game theory text such as
Myerson (1991). We refer readers to these texts for the proof and further explanation.
3.2 Inequality Restrictions on Conditional Choice Probabilities via Corre-
lated Equilibria
In this subsection, we derive the inequality restrictions imposed by correlated equilibrium on
the conditional choice probabilities. We first write down the incentive constraints implied by
correlated equilibria for a game Γ (X, θ, ²). Based on these incentive constraints, we then derive
a set of inequality restrictions on conditional choice probabilities. These inequality restrictions
do not involve the ² and will form the basis for our estimation.
Fix a game Γ (X, θ, ²). Let player i′s Nash equilibrium strategy in this game be σi (X, θ, ²) =
(σi (X, θ, ²) (ai))ai∈Ai ∈ 4 (Ai). Hence, in our notation, σi (X, θ, ²) is a vector of probabilities
with the element corresponding to the action ai being σi (X, θ, ²) (ai). From now on, if confusion
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does not arise, we will suppress the dependence of σi on (X, θ, ²) to make our notation less
cumbersome. However, we should keep in mind the dependence of the equilibrium strategy on
the specific game being played. Suppose σ = (σi)i∈I is an equilibrium of the game Γ (X, θ, ²).
Let µ = (µ (a))a∈A ∈ 4 (A) denote the induced probability distribution over the set of action
profiles A. It then follows that µ (a) =
∏
i∈I
σi (ai). Thus, each equilibrium σ uniquely determines
a probability distribution over the set of action profiles.
Since the game Γ (X, θ, ²) may have multiple equilibria, there are possibly multiple equilib-
rium probability distributions corresponding to the game. Let CE (X, θ, ²) denote the set of
correlated equilibria for the game Γ (X, θ, ²). Suppose the data on the observed action profiles
are generated by a specific equilibrium distribution µ (X, θ, ²) = (µ (X, θ, ²) (a))a∈A ∈ 4 (A).
It then follows that µ (X, θ, ²) ∈ CE (X, θ, ²) since µ (X, θ, ²) is a Nash equilibrium, and by
theorem 1, all the Nash equilibria are contained in the set of correlated equilibria. In the
following we will derive the population restrictions on (X, θ) from the relationship µ (X, θ, ²) ∈
CE (X, θ, ²).
Because it belongs to the set of correlated equilibria of Γ (X, θ, ²), µ (X, θ, ²) satisfies the
incentive constraints in (2) required by the definition of correlated equilibria. Formally, for
∀i ∈ N,∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀di ∈ Ai,∑
a−i∈A−i
[µ (X, θ, ²) (a)]ui (a−i, ai, Xi, θ, ²i) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
[µ (X, θ, ²) (a)]ui (a−i, di, Xi, θ, ²i) ,
where the left hand side is player i′s expected payoff for following the instruction while the
right hand side is player i′s expected payoff from deviating to play di.
Note that the expectations on both sides are taken with respect to the probability distribution
µ (X, θ, ²). By making implicit the dependence of the vector µ on (X, θ, ²), we rewrite the
above incentive constraints as
∑
a−i∈A−i
µ (a)ui (a−i, ai, Xi, θ, ²i) ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
µ (a)ui (a−i, di, Xi, θ, ²i) .
By substituting the specification of the payoff function (Equation 1) and rearranging terms,
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we have that for ∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀di ∈ Ai,∑
a−i∈A−i
µ (a) [fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ)− fi (a−i, di, Xi, θ)] ≥
∑
a−i∈A−i
µ (a) [²i (di)− ²i (ai)] . (3)
The left hand side is player i′s expected loss in the deterministic part of the payoff by deviating
for the instructed action ai to another action di. The right hand side is his expected gain in the
random part of the payoff from such deviation. Then the above incentive constraints stipulate
that the expected loss in the deterministic part of the payoff is greater than the expected gain
in the random part of the payoff.
The expectation of the left hand side of inequality (5) conditional on the covariates X is:
E
 ∑
a−i∈A−i
µ (a) [fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ)− fi (a−i, di, Xi, θ)] |X

=
∑
a−i∈A−i
E [µ (a) |X] · [fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ)− fi (a−i, di, Xi, θ)]
≡
∑
a−i∈A−i
Pr (a|X,µ) · [fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ)− fi (a−i, di, Xi, θ)] ,
where Pr (a|X,µ) denotes the conditional choice probability that the action profile a is chosen
under equilibrium distribution µ.
Similarly, the expectation of the right hand side of inequality (3) conditional on the covariates
X is:
E
 ∑
a−i∈A−i
µ (a) [εi (di)− εi (ai)] |X
 = E {σi (ai) [²i (di)− ²i (ai)] |X} , (4)
where the equality follows from the fact that µ (a) =
∏
i∈I
σi (ai). Since player i′s equilibrium
strategy σi (ai) depends on its own vector of payoff shocks, ²i, (4) in general is not equal to
zero. We can, however, obtain its lower bound:
E {σi (ai) [²i (di)− ²i (ai)] |X} ≥ −E {|²i (di)− ²i (ai)| |X} = −E {|²i (di)− ²i (ai)|} , (5)
where the weak inequality follows from the fact that σi (ai) ∈ [0, 1], and the equality from the
assumption that payoff shocks are independent of the covariates.
Since ²i (ai) is i.i.d. across i and ai, and has a known distributionG (·), then E {|εi (di)− εi (ai)|}
is also known. Let `G denote E {|εi (di)− εi (ai)|}. Hence, (3) implies the following system of
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∑
i∈I ‖Ai‖ · (‖Ai‖ − 1) inequalities:∑
a−i∈A−i Pr (a|X,µ) · [fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ)− fi (a−i, di, Xi, θ)] ≥ −`G,
∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ Ai, ∀di ∈ Ai
This system of inequalities imposes restrictions on Pr (a|X,µ), the conditional choice prob-
ability under a certain equilibrium distribution µ. Suppose the true equilibrium selection
mechanism (unobserved to the econometrician) is such that µ is chosen from the correspon-
dence U with probability λ (µ). Since Pr (a|X) = ∫U Pr (a|X,µ)λ (dµ), it immediately follows
that the conditional choice probability Pr (a|X) satisfies the same system of inequalities, i.e.,∑
a−i∈A−i Pr (a|X) · [fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ)− fi (a−i, di, Xi, θ)] ≥ −`G,
∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ Ai,∀di ∈ Ai.
(6)
The inequalities in (6) are linear in the payoffs due to the linearity of correlated equilibria.
In many empirical applications, the payoff function fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ) is specified to be linear
in parameter θ. Hence, the above system is linear in θ. As will become clear later when
we present the estimation procedure, this feature proves to be very important in reducing
the computational burden in our set estimates. We summarize the discussion above in the
following proposition:
Proposition 1 Consider a parameterized static discrete game of complete information Γ (X, θ, ²).
Suppose the payoff structure of this parameterized game is specified as in (1) and the economet-
ric error ²i (ai) is i.i.d. across ∀i ∈ I,∀ai ∈ Ai, and has a known distribution G (·). Further-
more, let `G = EG {|²i (di)− ²i (ai)|}. Then the conditional choice probability Pr (a|X) satisfies
the system of inequalities as in (6).
Remark 1. The restrictions on conditional choice probabilities imposed by (6) allow both pure
and mixed strategies. To appreciate the importance of allowing for mixed strategy equilibria
when we make inferences about the payoff structure of a game, consider the following example.
Suppose we observe that both firms choose to enter in the above 2× 2 entry game. If mixed
strategies are not allowed, we may infer that, for example, the spillover effect δ is low or the
market conditions are good, since both firms have chosen to enter. However, if we did not rule
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out mixed strategy equilibria, the observation that both firms enter may merely be the result
of a randomization by the firms. Hence, ruling out the mixed strategy equilibria can cause
bias when the observed outcomes are indeed generated by some mixed strategy equilibria. ¥
Relationship (6) is a population restriction. Under the formulation of the inferential problem
in Section 2.3, suppose the true equilibrium selection mechanism is the same across different
observations, i.e., λn = λ. If the econometrician has cross-sectional data of {(an, Xn)}Nn=1, the
sample restriction associated with (6) is that for each n = 1, ..., N ,∑
a−i∈A−i Pr (a
n|Xn) · [fi (an−i, ani , Xni , θ)− fi (an−i, dni , Xni , θ)] ≥ −`G
∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ Ai,∀di ∈ Ai
, (7)
where Pr (an|Xn) = ∫U Pr (an|Xn, µ)λ (dµ). This system of restrictions is a generalization of
standard statistical models in the sense that the sample relationship here does not take the
form of equalities. Also, one subtlety arises when we apply the sample relationship (7) to the
inferential problem facing the econometrician. Since we do not impose any assumption on λ,
the conditional choice probability Pr (an|Xn) is unknown. In a typical two-stage approach,
researchers would use {(an, Xn)}Nn=1 to estimate Pr (an|Xn). This paper also uses a two-stage
estimation approach, which is discussed in detail in the section on estimation.
Before moving on to the next section on identification and estimation, we look at the above
population restrictions in the entry example from earlier. In this example, there are two
players each of whom has two available actions. Hence, there are 4 inequalities. The true
data generating process implies the following 4 conditional choice probabilities: Pr (E,E|X),
Pr (E,N |X), Pr (N,E|X), and Pr (N,N |X), where Pr (E,E|X) means the conditional choice
probability that both firms enter and Pr (E,E|X) is the conditional choice probability that
firm 1 enters but firm 2 does not, etc. Finally, we assume ²i (ai) ∼ N (0, 1) for ∀i ∈ I,∀ai ∈ Ai.
Hence `G ≈ 1.80. The concept of correlated equilibrium requires that when a firm is instructed
to play “enter” or “not enter,” it does not have incentives to deviate. Therefore,
Pr (E,E|X) · (β ·X1 − δ)+ Pr (E,N |X) · (β ·X1)+ 1.80 ≥ 0
−Pr(N,E|X) · (β ·X1 − δ)− Pr (N,N |X) · (β ·X1)+ 1.80 ≥ 0
Pr(E,E|X) · (β ·X2 − δ)+ Pr(N,E|X) · (β ·X2)+ 1.80 ≥ 0
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−Pr(E,N |X) · (β ·X2 − δ)− Pr(N,N |X) · (β ·X2)+ 1.80 ≥ 0
4 Identification and Estimation
As we have argued above, economic theory imposes the restrictions as in (6). Let the vector
y =
[
y1, ..., y‖A‖
]
list all the possible outcomes. The vector
Pr (y|X) = [Pr (y1|X) , ...,Pr (yl|X) , ...,Pr (y‖A‖|X)]
then provides the conditional choice probability for each possible outcome. Furthermore,
fix ∀ai ∈ Ai, define a mapping Υai : 4 (A) → 4 (A−i) as follows. Given any probabil-
ity distribution ν ∈ 4 (A), let Υai (ν) = [ν (ai, a−i)]a−i∈A−i . That is, Υai (ν) is a subvector
of ν that consists of all the elements in ν that correspond to those action profiles having
ai as their ith component. As an example to illustrate the meaning of mapping Υai (·),
suppose we have a two-player game, where A1 = {T,B} and A2 = {L,R}. Let vector
ν = [ν (T, L) , ν (T,R) , ν (B,L) , ν (B,R)]. If we take a1 = T , then ΥT (v) = [ν (T, L) , ν (T,R)].
Similarly, ΥB (v) = [ν (B,L) , ν (B,R)], etc.
Let
Fi (ai, Xi, θ) ≡ [fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ)]a−i∈A−i .
We then rewrite condition (6) in the following vector form:
Υai [Pr (y|X)] · [Fi (ai, Xi, θ)− Fi (di, Xi, θ)] + `G ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I,∀ai ∈ Ai,∀di ∈ Ai. (8)
Definition 1. Given covariates X and a parameter θ, define CE (X, θ) to be the set of condi-
tional choice probabilities that satisfy the system of inequalities (8):
CE (X, θ) = {ν ∈ 4 (A) |Υai [ν] · [Fi (ai, Xi, θ)− Fi (di, Xi, θ)] + `G ≥ 0, ∀i ∈ I, ∀ai, di ∈ Ai}
The identified features of the model are the parameter values that satisfy the following restric-
tions:
ΘI = {θ ∈ Θ : Pr (y|X) ∈ CE (X, θ) , a.s.} .
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Intuitively, the identified set of parameters ΘI represents the set of parameter vectors that
satisfy the restrictions imposed by theory for all X almost surely; in other words, the economic
models corresponding to ΘI are consistent with the data almost everywhere. Depending on
whether ΘI is a singleton or a set, our econometric model of the game is just or under identified.
In order to define the identified set ΘI via minimizing a population objective function, we need
to formally define the notion of distance between a probability vector and a set of probability
vectors. The choice of distance metric depends on the nature of the problem at hand. Ciliberto
and Tamer (2006) chose the minimum distance between a point and the points in the set as
the distance metric between a point and a set. In this paper, we define the distance metric in
a way that facilitates the transformation of the optimization problem into a linear program.
Specifically, we measure the distance between Pr (y|X) and CE (X, θ) in the following:
CE (X, θ) is defined in terms of a total of
∑
i∈I ‖Ai‖ · (‖Ai‖ − 1) linear inequalities, which can
be indexed by a combination of player and action pair (i, ai, di). Roughly, we check whether
Pr (y|X) violates these inequalities, one by one. Whenever Pr (y|X) violates an inequality,
we “penalize” it by how much this inequality is violated. Formally, if we denote the distance
between Pr (y|X) and CE (X, θ) as d [Pr (y|X) ,CE (X, θ)], then
d [Pr (y|X) ,CE (X, θ)]
=
∑
(i,ai,di)
|min {0,Υai [Pr (y|X)] · [Fi (ai, Xi, θ)− Fi (di, Xi, θ)] + `G}| . (9)
In expression (9), the sign of the second term in the minimum function indicates whether the
associated restriction is violated. When it is positive, the restriction is not violated and the
corresponding penalty is 0. When it is negative, the restriction is violated and the penalty is the
distance this term is away from 0. It is straightforward to see that d [Pr (y|X) ,CE (X, θ)] = 0
if and only if Pr (y|X) ∈ CE (X, θ). It is important to note that d [Pr (y|X) ,CE (X, θ)] is
piecewise linear and convex in θ if the deterministic part of the payoff function fi (a,Xi, θ)
is specified to be linear in θ. This piecewise linearity and convexity proves to be a crucial
property that we will exploit in computing our estimates. Details appear in the next section.
Having defined the distance metric d, we are now ready to express the identified set ΘI via a
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minimization problem. Define a function D : Θ→ R+ such that
D (θ) =
∫
SX
d [Pr (y|X) , CE (X, θ)] dFX
where FX is the distribution of the covariates X. Therefore, ΘI can be rewritten as
ΘI = argmin
θ∈Θ
D (θ) (10)
5 Estimation Approach
In this section, we provide detailed procedures for implementing the two-step estimator out-
lined in the last section. In the first stage, we consistently estimate the conditional choice
probabilities Pr (y|X) using a multinomial logit model. We then recover the structural para-
meters in the second stage. For partially identified models, we seek the bounds estimation of
the true parameters by applying recently developed techniques in the literature on set estima-
tion of partially identified models. We provide both the set estimates and confidence regions
for the identified set of parameters. As stated in proposition 3 below, our method provides
a consistent (in the Hausdorff sense) set estimate for partially identified models. We then
proceed to consider the case in which the model is completely identified. For these models, our
two-step approach reduces to a sharp two-step minimum distance estimator. We also provide
the asymptotic theory of our estimator when the model is completely identified: under suit-
able regularity conditions, our two-step approach gives a consistent and asymptotically normal
estimate of the true parameter.
5.1 First Stage: Estimating the Conditional Choice Probabilities
Suppose the econometrician has access to cross-sectional data on n = 1, ..., N repetitions of the
game, (Y n, Xn), where Y n ∈ A and Xn are the observed outcome and covariates, respectively.
In the first stage, we form an estimate P̂r (y|X) =
[
P̂r (y1|X) , ..., P̂r (yl|X) , ..., P̂r
(
y‖A‖|X
)]
of
Pr (y|X) = [Pr (y1|X) , ...,Pr (yl|X) , ...,Pr (y‖A‖|X)] using a multinomial logit model. That
is, we parameterize the conditional choice probabilities as follows:
Pr (yl|X) = exp (X · βl)
1 +
∑‖A‖
m=2 exp (X · βm)
, l = 2, ..., ‖A‖,
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where we normalize β1 to equal 0. We can then use MLE to obtain the estimate β̂l of βl,
l = 2, ..., ‖A‖. Therefore, given the nth observation of the covariates, Xn, the predicted choice
probability for the outcome yl (l = 1, ..., ‖A‖) is
P̂r (yl|Xn) =
exp
(
Xn · β̂l
)
∑‖A‖
m=1 exp
(
Xn · β̂m
) ,
with β̂1 ≡ 0.
For this stage, we have assumed that the conditional choice probabilities Pr (y|X,β) are pa-
rameterized by a finite parameter vector β. In particular, we have assumed Pr (y|X,β) are
multinomial logit as specified in (12). In principle, one could use other methods such as non-
parametric or semiparametric approaches to estimate these conditional choice probabilities.
However, in many applications, the number of covariates included in X is likely to be large,
which would cause the problem of the “curse of dimensionality” for the nonparametric ap-
proach. As for the semiparametric approach, we can use the sieve estimator to obtain the
estimate of the equilibrium strategies, but at a lower convergence rate than root N (Ai and
Chen, 2004). In the point-identified model below, the consistency of the second stage estimator
does not depend on the convergence rate of the first stage. The asymptotic normality does,
however. Thus, if we care only about the consistency of the second stage, we can use the more
flexible sieve estimator for our first-stage estimation.
5.2 Second Stage: Bounds Estimation
As mentioned earlier, the identified features of our model are the solutions to the minimization
problem in (10) above. In general, one does not know whether the population objective function
D (θ) has a unique or multiple minimizers in the parameter space. Unless one imposes strict
identifying assumptions, the model is not point identified. In light of the recent econometrics
literature on partially identified models, we seek to make inferences directly on the set ΘI
without imposing identifying assumptions that ensure ΘI is a singleton.
To obtain an estimate of set ΘI , we minimize a feasible sample analog of the population
objective function D (θ) in (10). In so doing, we replace the conditional choice probabilities
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Pr (y|X) by its estimate P̂r (y|X), which we obtained in the first stage. The feasible sample
objective function D̂N (θ) is then the following:
D̂N (θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
d
[
P̂r (y|Xn) , CE (Xn, θ)
]
(11)
Following Manski and Tamer (2002), we define Θ̂I , the estimate of the set ΘI as follows:
Θ̂I =
{
θ ∈ Θ|D̂N (θ) ≤ min
θ∈Θ
D̂N (θ) + τN
}
(12)
for some τN > 0, where τN → 0 as the sample size N → ∞. That is, we define our estimate
of the set ΘI to include all the θ′s that are within τN from minimizing the sample objective
function D̂N (θ). The proposition below characterizes the set estimate Θ̂I .
Proposition 2 Θ̂I is a convex polytope in RJ .
This property of Θ̂I is convenient since it implies that the confidence interval of each indi-
vidual parameter is a closed interval without any “holes” in it. Hence, in order to construct
the confidence interval of an individual parameter, it is sufficient to find the minimum and
maximum values of this parameter, given the constraint that the whole parameter vector has
to be in the set Θ̂I .
To understand the large sample behavior of the set Θ̂I that was constructed above, we follow
Manski and Tamer (2002) to define the distance between two sets Θ, Θ′ ⊆ RJ as
ρ
(
Θ,Θ′
) ≡ sup
θ∈Θ
inf
θ′∈Θ′
|θ − θ′|.
Roughly, ρ (Θ,Θ′) measures the greatest distance between a point θ ∈ Θ and the set Θ′. Also
note that ρ (Θ,Θ′) may not equal ρ (Θ′,Θ) under this definition of distance between two sets
Θ and Θ′. We state the following proposition that characterizes the large sample behavior of
Θ̂I , which is adapted from a similar proposition given in Ciliberto and Tamer (2006).
Proposition 3 Suppose the estimated conditional choice probability distribution P̂r (y|X) con-
verges to the true conditional choice probability Pr (y|X) almost surely as the sample size
N →∞. Furthermore, let the perturbation parameter τN be such that (i) τN > 0; (ii) τN → 0
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as N → ∞; (iii) supθ|D̂N (θ) − D (θ) | = op (τN ). Then both ρ
(
ΘI , Θ̂I
)
and ρ
(
Θ̂I ,ΘI
)
converge to 0 almost surely.
This proposition says that if the first stage estimator is consistent, then under standard regu-
larity conditions the distance between the identified set ΘI and the estimated set Θ̂I converges
with probability 1 to zero. Hence, under the distance metric ρ defined above, Θ̂I is a “con-
sistent” estimate of Θ. Note that the hypothesis of the theorem does not require the first
stage to be
√
N−consistent. Thus, the first stage can be estimated more flexibly using sieve
or other semiparametric approaches, and we still retain the consistency of the set estimates in
the second stage. We do not have results on the convergence rate of the set estimate due to
the fact that the speed of set convergence is a concept as yet not well defined in the literature.
To compute the set Θ̂I , we first minimize the sample objective function D̂N (θ) as defined
in (11), and then solve the system of inequalities D̂N (θ) ≤ minθ∈Θ D̂N (θ) + τN . In our
context, these two tasks are computationally convenient because of the inherent linearity of
our problem. To see this, note that in many applications, the deterministic part of the payoff
functions fi is linear in θ. Thus, by definition, the set CE (Xn, θ) is also linear in θ. It then
follows that D̂N (θ) is piecewise linear and convex in θ due to the specific way we defined
the distance metric d. Therefore, we can transform the minimization problem minθ∈Θ D̂N (θ)
into a linear program, which can be solved very efficiently using the interior point algorithm.
After solving this minimization problem, we obtain Θ̂I by finding all the θ′s that satisfy the
inequality D̂N (θ) ≤ minθ∈Θ D̂N (θ) + τN , which can also be achieved via linear programming
because of the piecewise linearity and convexity of D̂N (θ).
Finally, we can construct the confidence region for ΘI . Following the recent literature on set
inference, we say that a set Θ̂α is the confidence region of the identified set ΘI at a significance
level of α if Θ̂α covers ΘI asymptotically with probability α:
lim
n→∞Pr
(
ΘI ⊆ Θ̂α
)
= α
To construct such a confidence region, we adapt the nonparametric technique proposed by
Chernozhukov, Hong and Tamer (2004, and henceforth CHT) to our current context. Denote
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the minimum value of the sample objective function mint∈Θ D̂N (t) as qn and the level set as
Cn (c) ≡
{
θ ∈ Θ : n
[
D̂N (θ)−min
t∈Θ
D̂N (t)
]
≤ c
}
.
CHT proved that if we can choose an appropriate cutoff value c(α), the corresponding level
set Cn
[
c(α)
]
will cover the identified set ΘI asymptotically with probability α, that is, Θ̂α ≡
Cn
[
c(α)
]
will be the confidence region we seek.
Therefore, our task boils down to choosing the appropriate cutoff value c(α). In the context of
our problem, the subsampling procedure (CHT, 2004) used to pick c(α) consists of the following
steps:
1. Choose the initial value of the cutoff, c(0). Following CHT’s suggestion, we choose this
initial cutoff value to be 25% above the minimum sample objective function, i.e., we let
c(0) = 1.25qn.
2. Construct Bn subsamples of size b ¿ n. For each subsample bn = 1, ..., Bn, we com-
pute ĉbn = supθ∈Cn[c(0)] b
[
D̂bn (θ)− qbn
]
, where D̂bn (θ) is the sample objective function
corresponding to the subsample bn, and qbn is the minimum of D̂bn (θ) (over the entire
parameter space Θ).
3. Let c(α) be the α−quantile of {ĉbn}bn=1,...,Bn .
This subsampling procedure would usually be computationally demanding since it involves
solving optimization problems many times along the way. In fact, CHT (2004) and subsequent
applied work using this procedure has had to rely on simulated annealing to solve each of these
optimization problems. Hence, the computational burden for applying this procedure is very
high. In our context, however, the functions D̂N (θ) as well as D̂bn (θ) (bn = 1, ..., Bn) are
piecewise linear and convex in θ, which enables us to apply linear programming to solve the
optimization problems. This feature dramatically reduces our computational burden.
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5.3 Estimation of Point Identified Models
In the above bounds estimation, we did not assume the model to be identified, and our estimator
provides a set estimate Θ̂I and confidence region Θ̂α for the identified features ΘI of the model.
However, under some conditions, a game-theoretic model can be point identified. For example,
if there are a set of covariates that affect the payoff functions of some but not all players
(Bajari, Hong and Ryan, 2004; Bajari, Hong, Kraner and Nekipelov, 2005), then the model
might be point identified. It is worth pointing out, however, that identified models may still
have multiple equilibria, however, rendering the traditional direct approaches such as MLE or
GMM invalid.
For point-identified models, our estimator described in the above two subsections reduces to
the following sharp two-step minimum distance estimator. The first step is the same as in
the case of partial identification discussed above; that is, we estimate the conditional choice
probabilities using a multinomial logit model with parameter vector β. In the second step, we
obtain a point estimate θ̂I for the identified parameter θI by minimizing the sample objective
function D̂N
(
θ, β̂
)
3. That is,
θ̂I = argmin
θ∈Θ
D̂N
(
θ, β̂
)
. (13)
Now we can recast our two-step estimator as a GMM estimator with the identity weighting
matrix, namely, an MOM estimator. To see this, note that θ̂I solves the following first order
condition for the minimization problem (13),
1
N
N∑
n=1
∇θd
(
Xn, θ, β̂
)
= 0, (14)
except when ∇θd
(
Xn, θ, β̂
)
does not exist. Also, note that in (14), with a slight abuse of
notation, we let d
(
Xn, θ, β̂
)
denote d
[
P̂r
(
y|Xn, β̂
)
, CE (Xn, θ)
]
. By looking at the definition
of the distance metric in (9), we can see that ∇θd
(
Xn, θ, β̂
)
does not exist at the kinked points
3Note that there is a slight change in the notation in the current subsection: we explicitly include the first-
stage parameter β as an argument in the conditional choice probabilities Pr (y|X,β), the population objective
function D (·, ·), and the sample objective function dDN (·, ·). The purpose of making β explicit will become clear
below.
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of the function d
[
P̂r
(
y|Xn, β̂
)
, CE (Xn, θ)
]
. Hence, the set of realized values for Xn that
make ∇θd
(
Xn, θ, β̂
)
nonexistent equal the event
∪(i,ai,di)
{
X : Υai
[
P̂r
(
y|Xn, β̂
)]
· [Fi (ai, Xi, θ)− Fi (di, Xi, θ)] + `G = 0
}
,
which has a measure equal to 0. Thus, with probability equal to 1, θ̂I solves the first order
condition (14).
Furthermore, remember that β̂ is the maximizer of the log likelihood function
1
N
N∑
n=1
ln [Pr (yl|Xn, β)] ≡ 1
N
N∑
n=1
l (Xn, β) ,
and thus solves
1
N
N∑
n=1
∇βl (Xn, β) = 0. (15)
Hence, if we let g˜ (X, θ, β) =
[∇θd (Xn, θ, β)′ ,∇βl (Xn, β)′], then (14) and (15) are just the two
components of the joint moment equation 1N
∑N
n=1 g˜
(
Xn, θ̂I , β̂
)
= 0. Therefore, our two-step
estimator can be viewed as a GMM estimator. Finally, note that the first-stage parameter
β does not depend on θ, thus, we do not have a recursion problem. The following lemma
summarizes the above reformulation of our two-step estimator as a GMM estimator.
Lemma 1 With probability 1,
(
β̂, θ̂I
)
solves the system of equations in (14) and (15). Hence,
the two-step estimator is a GMM estimator with moment functions defined by (14) and (15).
In the following, we will state a proposition that establishes the asymptotic normality of
our estimator when the model is point identified. The standard argument for obtaining the
asymptotic normality for a GMM estimator is based on the Taylor expansion and requires the
moment functions to be once differentiable. Although the moment function ∇θd
(
Xn, θ, β̂
)
associated with the second stage is not differentiable in our model, we can still obtain the
asymptotic normality of θ̂I by applying theorem 7.2 in Newey and McFadden (1994). This
theorem provides sufficient conditions for a GMM estimator to be asymptotically normal when
the sample moment is a nonsmooth function. In the following, we state the primitive conditions
on our model that guarantee the sufficient conditions in theorem 7.2 of Newey and McFadden
(1994):
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A1. The conditional choice probabilities Pr (y|X,β) are parameterized by a finite vector β and
take the form of multinomial logit. The true parameter β0 is in the interior of parameter space
B.
A2. Parameter space Θ is convex. θI is an interior point of Θ and uniquely minimizesD
(
θ, β0
)
.
A3. The deterministic part of payoff function fi (a−i, ai, Xi, θ) is bounded in SX ×Θ, is twice
differentiable in Xi and θ, and has bounded first and second derivatives.
A4. Xn are i.i.d. across n with E‖Xn‖2 <∞.
A1 is a convenient assumption that researchers often invoke in practice. However, the multino-
mial logit specification is not essential for our asymptotic result on θ̂I . One could alternatively
specify Pr (y|X,β) to be probit. A2 is an identification assumption. A3 and A4 provide cer-
tain dominance properties required to establish the stochastic equicontinuity of the sample
moments, an essential condition for obtaining asymptotic normality. A4 rules out some types
of covariates that are fat tailed.
We are now ready to state the following proposition that establishes the asymptotic normality
of θ̂I when the model is point identified:
Proposition 4 Suppose A1-A4 hold. Let g(1) (X,β) and g(2) (X,β, θ) denote the first- and
second-stage moment functions as in (15) and (14), respectively. Let g(1)0
(
β0
) ≡ E [g(1) (X,β0)]
and g(2)0
(
β0, θI
) ≡ E [g(2) (X,β0, θI)] denote the expectations of these moment functions eval-
uated at the true parameter value
(
β0, θI
)
, respectively. Furthermore, let
G
(1)
β ≡ ∇βg(1)0
(
β0
)
, G
(2)
β ≡ ∇βg(2)0
(
β0, θI
)
, G
(2)
θ ≡ ∇θg(2)0
(
β0, θI
)
,
Ψ
(
X,β0, θI
) ≡ − G(2)β · [G(1)β · g(1) (X,β0)] ,
Λ ≡ E
{[
g(2)
(
X,β0, θI
)
+Ψ
(
X,β0, θI
)] [
g(2)
(
X,β0, θI
)
+Ψ
(
X,β0, θI
)]′}
.
Then, as N →∞, √N
(
θ̂I − θI
)
d→ N (0, V ), where V ≡
[
G
(2)
θ
]−1
Λ
[
G
(2)
θ
]′−1
.
As is typical of any two-step estimator, the variance of θ̂I is adjusted by taking into account
the first-stage variances, as reflected in term Λ. Also, V depends on the true parameters θI
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and β0. In practice, we may replace θI and β0 by their estimates θ̂I and β̂, respectively. We
can also use bootstrap to estimate V . As will be detailed in the proof, our sample objective
function d
[
P̂r
(
y|Xn, β̂
)
, CE (Xn, θ)
]
can be written as the objective function in the quantile
regression models by setting the appropriate quantile to be 0. Heuristically, since quantile
estimates are generally asymptotically normal, it is not surprising that our estimator is also
asymptotically normal. Of course, the proofs differ in some important ways.
5.4 Discussion of the Estimation Approach
In this paper we have assumed that the true equilibrium selection mechanism {λn}Nn=1 is the
same across different observations; i.e., λn = λ for all n, even though the econometrician is
assumed not to possess any knowledge about λ. The purpose of assuming the equilibrium
selection mechanism to be the same across observations is to allow the econometrician to con-
sistently estimate the conditional choice probability distribution Pr (y|X). If this assumption
does not hold in the data, the conditional choice probability distribution Prn (y|X) in general
would be observation-specific, since the functional form of Prn (y|X) = ∫U Pr (y|X,µ)λn (dµ)
depends upon n. As a consequence, the first stage would not offer an estimate of Pr (y|X),
but rather an estimate of the mixing distribution among the different Prn (y|X).
To see more clearly the consequence of violating this assumption, suppose for some obser-
vations that the conditional choice probability distribution equals Pr′ (y|X), while the other
observations have Pr
′′
(y|X). In this situation, the first-stage estimation will return an es-
timate of the mixing distribution between Pr′ (y|X) and Pr′′ (y|X), denoted as Prmix (y|X).
Consider, specifically, two observation units, l and k, which have conditional choice probability
distributions Pr′ (y|X) and Pr′′ (y|X), respectively. Then according to (7), we have:∑
a−i∈A−i Pr
′ (y|X l) · [fi (al−i, ali, X li , θ)− fi (al−i, dli, X li , θ)] ≥ −`G,
∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ Ai,∀di ∈ Ai.
(16)
and ∑
a−i∈A−i Pr
′′ (
y|Xk) · [fi (ak−i, aki , Xki , θ)− fi (ak−i, dki , Xki , θ)] ≥ −`G,
∀i ∈ I, ∀ai ∈ Ai,∀di ∈ Ai.
(17)
Note that Prmix
(
y|X l) does not necessarily satisfy condition (16), since Pr” (y|X l) may violate
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it. Similarly, Prmix
(
y|Xk) does not necessarily satisfy (17). Hence, the mixing distribution
Prmix (y|X) may not satisfy the sample restrictions as in (7). As a consequence, the two-step
approach would not be valid, since the first-stage estimation gives an estimate of the mixing
between these two conditional choice probability distributions, which no longer necessarily
satisfy the sample restrictions.
6 Monte Carlo Evidence
In this section we present Monte Carlo evidence for the two-step estimation approach described
in the last section. In order to illustrate the performance of the method for a general class of
models, we do not impose point identification assumptions when designing the Monte Carlo
experiments below. Therefore, we seek the set estimates and confidence intervals for the
identified features of these models. Section 5.1 describes the design; Section 5.2 presents the
results of the experiments.
6.1 Design of the Monte Carlo Experiments
In designing the experiments, we use two different models to generate the outcome data. The
first model uses a 2 × 2 entry game similar to the one described in Section 2. In this model,
each of the two firms decides whether or not to enter a single market. Hence Ai = {1, 0}, where
ai = 1 means player i enters the market and ai = 0 means the opposite. For the purpose of
our Monte Carlo experiments, we specify the profit function for each firm i to be as follows:
pii (a, x, β, δ, ²i) =
[
β1x1 + β2x2 − δ · 1 {a−i = 1}+ ²i
] · 1 {ai = 1} . (18)
In this specification, x1 and x2 are the covariates representing the market-specific character-
istics, which may be, for example, the demand shifters. Thus, β1 and β2 capture the effects
of x1 and x2 on each firm’s profits, respectively. In addition, δ measures the spillover effect
of one firm’s entry on the other’s profits; ²i represents firm i′s profit shock, which is common
knowledge among the firms, but unobserved by the econometrician. Finally, each firm earns
zero profit if it does not enter the market.
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The second model we use is also an entry game but with three firms. In order to facilitate
comparison in the Monte Carlo results across these two models, we specify the profit function
to be the same as in (18), except that we now need to incorporate the fact that there are three
firms:
pii (a, x, β, δ, ²i) =
β1x1 + β2x2 − δ ·∑
j 6=i
1 {aj = 1}+ ²i
 · 1 {ai = 1} . (19)
The only difference between this profit function and the function in (18) is the term following
the coefficient δ,
∑
j 6=i 1 {aj = 1}, which takes into account the fact that we now have three
firms.
After setting up the payoff structures, we specify the values of the parameters and the distri-
butions of the covariates and profit shocks. The parameter vector is set to be
(
β1, β2, δ
)
=
(1.0,−1.0, 5.5). Furthermore, we let the profit shock ²′is be i.i.d. across i and distributed as
standard normal N (0, 1), as well as be independent of the covariates x1 and x2, which are
themselves assumed to be independent of each other. We specify x1 and x2 to be normally
distributed with x1 ∼ N (0, 5) and x2 ∼ N (1, 7), respectively. It is important to observe that
the supports of the normal distributions are unbounded. As Manski and Tamer (2002) have
pointed out, for set-identified models, wide variations in the covariates help shrink the set
estimates of the parameters. Hence, the specifications of the distributions for the covariates
here tend to create a bias towards finding narrower intervals for the parameters. Thus, if we
instead specified the covariates to be uniformly distributed, we may tend to find wider interval
parameter estimates.
To generate the outcome data, we assume the firms play a Nash equilibrium. However, given
the parameters specified above, for some realizations of the covariates and of the econometric
errors, the models we consider might have multiple equilibria. We assume each equilibrium is
picked with equal probability in such situations. Also, if a mixed-strategy equilibrium happens
to be chosen, the outcome of the game will be determined randomly according to the probability
distribution defined by this mixed-strategy equilibrium.
Finally, we specify the sample size for the experiments. For each of the two experiments, we
draw 600 samples of size N = 500, N = 1000, and N = 2000, using the distributions specified
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above. In each experiment, corresponding to each specification of the sample size, we will
report the averages of the set estimates and of the confidence intervals, where the average is
taken over the 600 different samples. The next subsection presents these results.
6.2 Results from the Monte Carlo Experiments
Table 1 reports the results corresponding to the Monte Carlo experiments. Each entry in
this table has two closed intervals associated with it. The top intervals provide the means of
the interval parameter estimates across the 600 samples with corresponding sizes; the bottom
intervals provide the means of the confidence intervals. The middle panel of the table corre-
sponds to the two-player game whose payoff structure is specified as in (18), while the right
panel corresponds to the three-player game for which we specify the payoff functions as in (19).
In both experiments conducted, we normalize β1 to be equal to 1.0, since the players’ choices
remain unchanged if we multiply all the parameters by the same positive number. Hence, in
the table, we list only the entries associated with β2 and δ, with the understanding that β1
equals 1.0.
Before looking closely at the results displayed in the table, let us explain briefly how we
obtained these numbers using the corresponding procedures described in Section 4. For each
sample, whether its size equals N = 500, N = 1000, or N = 2000, we first obtain the set
of parameter vectors Θ̂I that are within τN = 1N from minimizing the corresponding sample
objective function. This set is described in (12). After solving the embedded minimization
problem minθ∈Θ D̂N (θ) using linear programming, we insert the corresponding minimum values
back into (12) and can completely characterize Θ̂I in terms of a system of linear inequalities.
After obtaining Θ̂I , we then project it onto each axis of the linear space RJ and obtain—again,
via linear programming—the lower and upper bounds of each interval parameter estimate, as
displayed in the table.
Computing the confidence intervals is more complex. We follow the subsampling procedure
presented in Section 5. We set the size of the subsample equal to 2% of the size of the original
sample. Thus, corresponding to N = 500, 1000, and 2000, the sizes of the subsamples are
b = 10, 20 and 40, respectively. We then let the number of subsamples bN = 20N ; i.e., for the
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original sample with size equal to 500, we construct 10, 000 subsamples, etc. The literature
provides little guidance as to how to choose the appropriate size for the subsamples as well as
how many subsamples should be constructed (Ciliberto and Tamer, 2006; Chernozhukov, Hong
and Tamer, 2004). In the current context, the subsample size and the number of subsamples
we are choosing are heuristic and based largely on computational considerations.
From this table, we can immediately see that none of the parameters is point identified, to
the extent that no interval parameter estimate is tightly centered around the true value of
the parameter. Nevertheless, these interval parameter estimates are more or less informative
of the true parameters. This observation is especially true for β2 in the sense that most of
the interval parameter estimates in the table contain the associated true parameter value. In
comparison, the interval parameter estimates for δ are less successful, especially for the two-
player game, where these interval estimates are systematically biased downward. Also, observe
that the confidence intervals are quite wide, which may be caused by the difficulty of obtaining
the accurate cutoff value c(α) in the subsampling procedure. Nonetheless, the overall picture
is encouraging, in the sense that we have obtained quite sensible set estimates and confidence
intervals at relatively low computational cost.
To look at the performance of the estimator in detail, we first compare the estimation results
of the two- and three-player models. From the table, we can see that when the sample size
is small, the bounds in the three-player game appear to be less tight than the corresponding
bounds in the two-player game. For example, when N = 500, the interval parameter estimate
for β2 in the three-player game is [−1.32, 0.98], which is much wider than its counterpart
[−1.59,−0.23] in the two-player game. This difference is even more obvious when we look at
the corresponding confidence intervals. However, as sample size increases to N = 2000, the
estimator performs better in three-player models than in two-player models. This is the case
for both β2 and δ. For example, the interval parameter estimate for β2 is [−1.30,−0.87] in
the three-player game and [−1.42,−0.93] in the two-player game, while the interval parameter
estimates for δ are [5.28, 5.97] and [5.15, 5.49], respectively.
In principle, our estimator should produce tighter bounds in a game with more players and/or
actions. More specifically, recall that the number of inequality restrictions imposed by corre-
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lated equilibria equals
∑
i∈I ‖Ai‖ · (‖Ai‖ − 1), which is monotonically increasing in both the
number of players and the number of actions each player has. As a consequence, for games of
larger scale, the parameters need to satisfy more inequality restrictions. Thus, the identified
regions for the parameters in a larger game tend to be smaller. However, when we conduct
the set inferences, we need to consistently estimate the conditional choice probabilities in the
first stage, which requires more data points when the number of potential outcomes grows.
Note that the number of outcomes for a game equals
∏
i∈I
‖Ai‖. Thus, we need more data to
consistently estimate the conditional choice probabilities in three-player games than we do in
two-player games. Therefore, the relative performance of our estimator in three-player vs.
two-player games depends on the sample size: when sample size is small, the estimate of the
conditional choice probabilities is less accurate, which counteracts the advantage of the three-
player game in having more inequality restrictions. When sample size is large enough, so that
the first stage estimation for the larger game is consistent, the greater number of inequality
restrictions associated with the larger game enables our estimator to produce narrower bounds.
Now let us consider the effect of sample size on the estimates. The results in the table indicate
that within the same model, the increase in sample size helps make the bounds tighter. This
is especially true for the three-player game, as we have discussed in the last paragraph. Our
results, however, do not offer clear indications regarding the rate of convergence of the interval
parameter estimates. In order to have a better idea about this, we would need to conduct
more extensive Monte Carlo experiments than we have conducted here.
7 Conclusion
This paper has proposed a two-step approach for estimating static discrete games with complete
information. This approach exploits the relationship between correlated equilibria and Nash
equilibria; namely, all the Nash equilibria of a static discrete game with complete information
are contained in the set of correlated equilibria of that same game. Starting from this theoretic
relationship, we derive a system of linear inequalities that the conditional choice probabilities
satisfy. This system of inequality restrictions suggest the following two-step procedure to
30
estimate the structural parameters in the payoff functions. In the first step, we estimate the
conditional choice probabilities that each possible outcome is realized by parametrically or
semiparametrically regressing the observed outcomes on the covariates. In the second step, we
recover the structural parameters by minimizing the sample average distance between the set
defined by the system of linear inequalities and the conditional choice probability vector that
we obtained in the first step.
Our estimation approach has both conceptual and computational advantages over some pre-
vious approaches for estimating static discrete games with complete information. At the con-
ceptual level, first, the restrictions we exploit have a rigorous theoretical foundation; second,
our estimator addresses both the issues of multiple equilibria and of the possible nonexistence
of pure strategy equilibria. At the computational level, our estimator exploits the inherent
linearity of correlated equilibria and applies the linear programming techniques to solve the
optimization problems that we encounter. Hence, compared to the previous approaches, our
estimator substantially reduces the computational costs. This feature is especially important
for games with a large number of players and/or a large strategy space.
Our estimator is robust to equilibrium behavior of the players. In this paper we have assumed
that players behave according to a Nash equilibrium. However, our estimation approach does
not rely on this assumption. For example, we can allow the players to communicate with each
other and play correlated equilibrium rather than Nash. As long as the stipulated equilibrium
which the players are assumed to play is contained in the set of correlated equilibria, our
approach still applies. In this sense, our estimator is robust to the behavioral assumptions
imposed on the players.
Our estimator is applicable to a wide range of game-theoretic models that are interesting to
I.O. economists. Examples include entry games, technology-adoption games, and labor force
participation games, among others. For instance, in a companion paper, we apply the method
developed here to study the equilibrium behavior of Texas hotels in choosing chain-affiliation
status (i.e., operating independently vs. becoming affiliated with a large chain). Since a
hotel’s franchising status may affect the market competition that ensues, we model hotels’
choices regarding franchising status as a game. We specify the reduced form of the profit
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functions and apply our method to estimate the parameters therein. The estimation results
suggest that the choice of franchising status is a strategic complement among Texas hotels.
A Mathematical appendix
A.1 Proof of Proposition 2
Note that D̂N (θ) is piecewise linear and convex in θ. The right hand side of the inequality in
the set defined by (12) does not depend on θ. Take ∀θ1, θ2 ∈ Θ̂I . By the convexity of D̂N (θ),
D̂N
[
α · θ1 + (1− α) · θ2] ≤ αD̂N (θ1)+ (1− α) D̂N (θ2) ,
for ∀α ∈ [0, 1]. It then follows that α · θ1 + (1− α) · θ2 ∈ Θ̂I , which implies that Θ̂I is convex.
Furthermore, note that Θ̂I is enclosed by hyperplanes due to the piecewise linearity of D̂N (θ).
The conclusion then immediately follows. ¥
A.2 Proof of Proposition 3
It follows from theorem 5b in Manski and Tamer (2002). ¥
A.3 Proof of Proposition 4
The proof of proposition 4 consists of two parts. In the first part, we establish consistency.
We then prove the asymptotic normality in the second part.
Part I. Consistency
Here, we want to prove that β̂
p→ β0 (consistency in the first stage) and θ̂I p→ θI (consistency
in the second stage). The first stage consistency follows immediately from the fact that we
obtained β̂ using Maximum Likelihood Estimation. Therefore, we only need to prove the
consistency for the second stage. Recall that
θ̂I = argmin
θ∈Θ
DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
≡ argmin
θ∈Θ
1
N
N∑
n=1
d
[
Pr
(
y|Xn, β̂N
)
, CE (Xn, θ)
]
,
where we write β̂ as β̂N in order to make it explicit that β̂N is a sample statistic. Given
assumptions A1−A4, by theorem 2.7 in Newey and McFadden (1994), it suffices to show the
following: 1.DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
is convex in θ; 2. There exists a function D0 (θ) such that D0 (θ) is
uniquely minimized at θI and DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
p→ D0 (θ) as N →∞ for all θ ∈ Θ.
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The convexity of DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
follows from the fact that d
[
Pr
(
y|Xn, β̂N
)
, CE (Xn, θ)
]
is con-
vex in θ due to the specific way we constructed the distance metric d. Let
D0 (θ) = E
{
d
[
Pr
(
y|X,β0) , CE (X, θ)]} ≡ D (β0, θ) ,
then θI uniquely minimizes D
(
β0, θ
)
by the identification assumption A2. Therefore, it only
remains to show that DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
p→ D (β0, θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Note that
DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
−D0 (θ) ≡ DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
−D (β0, θ)
=
[
DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
−DN
(
β0, θ
)]
+
[
DN
(
β0, θ
)−D (β0, θ)] .
Hence, it suffices to show that both these bracketed terms are op (1). Obviously, DN
(
β0, θ
) p→
D
(
β0, θ
)
for all θ by the weak law of large numbers. It needs a bit more work to show
DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
−DN
(
β0, θ
)
= op (1) for all θ. Since the function DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
is not continuously
differentiable, we cannot write out DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
−DN
(
β0, θ
)
using Taylor expansion. However,
as shown below, there exist two sequences of i.i.d. random variables {Kn}Nn=1 and {Jn}Nn=1,
both of which have bounded first moments, such that for all θ,
∣∣∣DN (β̂N , θ)−DN (β0, θ)∣∣∣ ≤ ∣∣∣β̂N − β0∣∣∣ · [ 1
N
N∑
n=1
Kn
]
+ op
(∣∣∣β̂N − β0∣∣∣) · [ 1
N
N∑
n=1
Jn
]
(20)
Then by the consistency in the first stage, the left hand side of the above inequality is op (1).
Our task now has been reduced to construct such sequences of i.i.d. random variables, {Kn}Nn=1
and {Jn}Nn=1.
Recall that
DN (β, θ) =
1
N
N∑
n=1
∑
i,ai,di
min {0,Υai [Pr (y|Xn, β)] · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ) + `G} ,
where 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ) denotes the change in player i′s deterministic payoff vector caused by
the deviation from ai to di. That is,
4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ) = Fi (ai, Xni , θ)− Fi (di, Xni , θ) .
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Hence, ∣∣∣DN (β̂N , θ)−DN (β0, θ)∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
n=1
∑
i,ai,di
 min{0,Υai [Pr(y|Xn, β̂N)] · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ) + `G}
−min{0,Υai [Pr (y|Xn, β0)] · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ) + `G}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
N
N∑
n=1
∑
i,ai,di
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 min{0,Υai [Pr(y|Xn, β̂N)] · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ) + `G}
−min{0,Υai [Pr (y|Xn, β0)] · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ) + `G}
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ 1
N
N∑
n=1
∑
i,ai,di
∣∣∣{Υai [Pr(y|Xn, β̂N)]−Υai [Pr (y|Xn, β0)]} · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ)∣∣∣ ,
where the first inequality follows by the triangular inequality and the second one follows from
the fact that |min {0, a} −min {0, b}| ≤ |a− b| for ∀a, b ∈ R. Since Pr (y|X,β) is continuously
differentiable in β,
Υai
[
Pr
(
y|Xn, β̂N
)]
−Υai [Pr (y|Xn, β0)] = ∣∣∣β̂N − β0∣∣∣·∇βΥai [Pr (y|Xn, β0)]+op (∣∣∣β̂N − β0∣∣∣)
(21)
Therefore, by substituting (21) into the second inequality in the above and rearranging terms,
we have ∣∣∣DN (β̂N , θ)−DN (β0, θ)∣∣∣
≤
∣∣∣β̂N − β0∣∣∣ · 1
N
N∑
n=1

∑
i,ai,di
∣∣∇βΥai [Pr (y|Xn, β0)] · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ)∣∣
+op (1) ·
∑
i,ai,di
|4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ)|
 .
Let
Kn =
∑
i,ai,di
∣∣∇βΥai [Pr (y|Xn, β0)] · 4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ)∣∣
and
Jn =
∑
i,ai,di
|4Fi (ai, di, Xni , θ)| ,
By the weak law of large numbers,
1
N
N∑
n=1
Kn
p→ E (K) ,
and
1
N
N∑
n=1
Jn
p→ E (J) .
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Thus, the right hand side of (20) is op (1), which implies that DN
(
β̂N , θ
)
−DN
(
β0, θ
)
= op (1).
Therefore, the consistency in the second stage has been proved. It is worth pointing out that
E (K) > 0, which implies that the first-stage consistency is necessary in order for us to establish
the second-stage consistency. To see this, let SX denote the support of X. Take a compact
set Q ⊆ SX such that Q has a positive probability measure. Since K is continuous for each
possible realization of X, it follows that K has minimum value k > 0 over the set Q. Hence,
E (K) = Pr (Q)E (K|Q) + [1− Pr (Q)]E (K|SXQ) ≥ kPr (Q) > 0,
where the equality follows from conditioning and the weak inequality follows from the fact that
K ≥ 0 for ∀X.
Part II. Asymptotic Normality
To prove the asymptotic normality of θ̂I , we apply theorem 7.2 in Newey and McFadden (1994).
This theorem provides sufficient conditions that guarantee the asymptotic normality of a GMM
estimator whose moment functions are nonsmooth. As we have seen in Lemma 1, our two-step
estimate
(
β̂, θ̂I
)
solves the following moment conditions
1
N
N∑
n=1
g (Xn, β, θ) = 0,
where
g (X,β, θ) ≡
[
g(1) (X,β, θ)′ , g(2) (X,β, θ)′
]′
=
[∇βl (X,β)′ ,∇θd (X, θ, β)′]′ .
It is easy to see that ∇θd (X, θ, β) is not differentiable. Let
g0 (β, θ) ≡
[
g
(1)
0 (β, θ)
′ , g(2)0 (β, θ)
′
]′
=
[
E [∇βl (X,β)]′ , E [∇θd (X, θ, β)]′
]′ .
Also, we let ĝN (β, θ) ≡ 1N
∑N
n=1 g (X
n, β, θ) denote the sample average of the moment func-
tions. We now verify all the hypotheses in theorem 7.2 following the steps below:
Condition 1: g0
(
β0, θI
)
= 0 where β0 and θI are the true parameters for β and θ, respectively.
By the assumption that the model is point identified, we have
θI = argmin
θ
E
{
d
[
Pr
(
y|X,β0)] , CE (X, θ)} .
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By the first order condition of this minimization problem,
∇θE
{
d
[
Pr
(
y|X,β0) , CE (X, θI)]} = 0.
Changing the order of integration and differentiation, we have
E
{∇θd [Pr (y|X,β0) , CE (X, θI)]} = 0.
That is,
g
(2)
0
(
β0, θI
)
= 0. (22)
By applying a similar argument to the first-stage estimation, we have
g
(1)
0
(
β0, θI
)
= 0. (23)
Hence, equations (22) and (23) imply that g0
(
β0, θI
)
= 0.
Condition 2: g0 (β, θ) is differentiable at
(
β0, θI
)
.
We will verify this condition together with the stochastic equicontinuity condition (condition
5) by applying theorem 7.3 in Newey and McFadden (1994) after checking conditions 3 and 4.
Condition 3:
(
β0, θI
)
is an interior point of the whole parameter space.
This condition is guaranteed by assumptions A1 and A2.
Condition 4: ĝN (β, θ) is asymptotically normal.
By assumptions A3 and A4,
Σ ≡ E
[
g
(
X,β0, θI
) · g (X,β0, θI)′] <∞.
Then by the Central Limit Theorem and condition 1 (which we have verified),
√
N [ĝN (β, θ)]
d→ N (0,Σ) .
Condition 5: Stochastic Equicontinuity: for any δN → 0,
sup
‖η−η0‖≤δN
√
N‖ĝN (η)− ĝN
(
η0
)− g0 (η) ‖upslope [1 +√N‖η − η0‖] p→ 0,
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where we denote η ≡ (β, θ), η0 ≡ (β0, θI) and η̂ ≡ (β̂, θ̂I). In the following, we apply theorem
7.3 of Newey and McFadden (1994) to verify condition 5 together with condition 2 above. This
theorem provides a sufficient condition for 2 and 5 to hold. This sufficient condition says that
if there exists a matrix 4X and a number ε > 0 such that:
(i) With probability one,
r (X, η) ≡ ‖g (X, η)− g (X, η0)−4X · (η − η0) ‖upslope∥∥η − η0∥∥→ 0,
as η → η0
(ii)
E
[
sup
‖η−η0‖<ε
r (X, η)
]
<∞
(iii)
1
N
N∑
n=1
4 (Xn) p→ E [4X]
then conditions 2 and 5 stated above are satisfied. We now check (i)− (iii). As will be clear
below, the key in proving the satisfaction of (i)− (iii) is to construct the matrix 4X.
Recall that the moment functions corresponding to the first and second stage are g(1) (X,β, θ) =
∇βl (X,β) and g(2) (X,β, θ) = ∇θd (X, θ, β), respectively. Let
L (ai, di, X, β, θ) ≡ Υai [Pr (y|X,β)] · [Fi (ai, Xi, θ)− Fi (di, Xi, θ)] + `G.
Then,
g(2) (X,β, θ) =
∑
(i,ai,di)
[−1 {L (ai, di, X, β, θ) < 0}] · ∇θL (ai, di, X, β, θ) .
Note that g(2) (X,β, θ) is not differentiable. However, if we ignored the part containing the
indicator function, the other part ∇θL (ai, di, X, β, θ) is continuously differentiable in both β
and θ. Based on this observation, we construct the matrix 4 (X) as follows:
4 (X) =
 ∂∂β∂β′ l (X,β0) 0∑
(i,ai,di)
[−1 {L < 0}] · ∂2L∂θ∂β
∑
(i,ai,di)
[−1 {L < 0}] · ∂2L
∂θ2
 ,
where we have suppressed the arguments in the function L and evaluate all the elements in
this matrix at the true parameter value
(
β0, θI
)
.
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Let us fix X and partition the matrix 4X as
4X =
 4(1)X
4(2)X
 ,
where 4(1)X has the same row dimension as ∂∂β∂β′ l
(
X,β0
)
. By substituting 4 (X) into the
expression of r (X, η) in the above, and use the triangular inequality, we have
r (X, η) = ‖g (X, η)− g (X, η0)−4X · (η − η0) ‖upslope∥∥η − η0∥∥
≤ ‖g(1) (X,β)− g(1) (X,β0)−4(1)X · (β − β0) ‖upslope∥∥β − β0∥∥
+‖g(2) (X, η)− g(2) (X, η0)−4(2)X · (η − η0) ‖upslope∥∥η − η0∥∥
≡ r(1) (X,β) + r(2) (X, η) . (24)
Note that r(1) (X,β) can be equivalently expressed as:
r(1) (X,β) = ‖∇βl (X,β)−∇βl
(
X,β0
)− ∂
∂β∂β′
l
(
X,β0
) · (β − β0) ‖upslope∥∥β − β0∥∥ (25)
Since ∇βl (X,β) is continuously differentiable, by the definition of derivatives, as β → β0, the
right hand side of equation (25) converges to 0. Hence, as β → β0,
r(1) (X,β)→ 0.
Therefore, it only remains to show that
r(2) (X, η)→ 0.
By substituting the expression for 4(2)X, we have:
r(2) (X, η) = ‖
∑
(i,ai,di)
∂
∂θ
L (ai, di, X, β, θ) · [−1 {L (ai, di, X, β, θ) < 0}]
−
∑
(i,ai,di)
∂
∂θ
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
) · [−1{L (ai, di, X, β0, θI) < 0}]
−
 ∑
(i,ai,di)
∂2
∂θ∂θ′
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
) · [−1{L (ai, di, X, β0, θI) < 0}]
 · (θ − θ0)
−
 ∑
(i,ai,di)
∂2
∂θ∂β′
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
) · [−1{L (ai, di, X, β0, θI) < 0}]
 · (β − β0) ‖.
Here, we consider two possibilities:
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1. −1{L (ai, di, X, β0, θI) < 0} = 0.
2. −1{L (ai, di, X, β0, θI) < 0} = −1.
In the first possibility, since the function L (ai, di, X, β, θ) is continuous in (β, θ), as (β, θ) →(
β0, θI
)
, −1 {L (ai, di, X, β, θ) < 0} → 0. Therefore, in some neighborhood around
(
β0, θI
)
,
r(2) (X, η) = 0.
For the second possibility, by the continuity of the function L, −1 {L (ai, di, X, β, θ) < 0} is
equal to −1 in a small neighborhood around (β0, θI). Therefore, in this neighborhood,
r(2) (X, η) = ‖
∑
(i,ai,di)
∂
∂θ
L (ai, di, X, β, θ)−
∑
(i,ai,di)
∂
∂θ
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
)
−
 ∑
(i,ai,di)
∂2
∂θ∂θ′
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
) · (θ − θ0)
−
 ∑
(i,ai,di)
∂2
∂θ∂β′
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
) · (β − β0) ‖.
Since L (ai, di, X, β, θ) is continuously differentiable, it then follows that for each X,
r(2) (X, η) = o
(∥∥η − η0∥∥) .
Hence, condition (i) is satisfied for this second possibility as well. We now move on to show
that conditions (ii) and (iii) are satisfied.
To verify condition (ii), observe that by the inequality in (24), it is sufficient to find ε > 0
such that
E
[
sup
‖η−η0‖<ε
r(1) (X,β)
]
<∞ (26)
and
E
[
sup
‖η−η0‖<ε
r(2) (X, η)
]
<∞ (27)
To prove (26), note that by (25) and triangle inequality it is sufficient to show
E
[
sup
‖η−η0‖<ε
‖ ∂
∂β∂β′
l
(
X,β0
) ‖] <∞,
39
which follows from writing out the term ∂∂β∂β′ l
(
X,β0
)
and then applying assumption A.4. We
obtain (27) using a similar argument as follows. First note that for ∀X ∈ SX , we have the
following inequality:
r(2) (X, η) ≤ ‖
∑
(i,ai,di)
∂
∂θ
L (ai, di, X, β, θ)−
∑
(i,ai,di)
∂
∂θ
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
)
−
 ∑
(i,ai,di)
∂2
∂θ∂θ′
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
) · (θ − θ0)
−
 ∑
(i,ai,di)
∂2
∂θ∂β′
L
(
ai, di, X, β
0, θI
) · (β − β0) ‖.
We then explicitly compute the derivatives on the right hand side of this inequality. (27) then
follows if we apply the triangle inequality as well as assumptions A3. and A4.
Hence, condition (ii) is satisfied. Finally, note that 4X has bounded first moment. Thus, by
the weak law of large numbers, condition (iii) is satisfied. So far, we have verified that all the
hypotheses in theorem 7.2 are satisfied. Let G = ∇ηg0
(
η0
)
. By theorem 7.2,
√
N
(
η̂ − η0) d→ N (0, G−1ΣG′−1) .
By partitioning the matrix G−1ΣG′−1 and selecting the block corresponding to the parameter
θ, the conclusion of proposition 4 follows. ¥
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Monte Carlo results
TABLE 1
2-player Game 3-player Game
N = 500
β2 = −1.0 [−1.59,−0.23] [−1.32, 0.98]
[−2.20, 0.08] [−2.73, 2.48]
δ = 5.5 [4.98, 5.34] [3.59, 4.82]
[4.21, 5.60] [3.20, 5.29]
N = 1000
β2 = −1.0 [−1.60,−0.88] [−2.29,−0.98]
[−2.10,−0.32] [−2.82, 0.00]
δ = 5.5 [4.31, 5.48] [5.02, 6.39]
[5.06, 6.12] [4.98, 7.80]
N = 2000
β2 = −1.0 [−1.42,−0.93] [−1.30,−0.87]
[−1.63, 0.10] [−1.90,−0.48]
δ = 5.5 [5.15, 5.49] [5.28, 5.97]
[5.28, 5.95] [4.23, 6.75]
Since we have normalized β1 to equal 1.0, we do not list its values in the table. The top
interval corresponding to each parameter is its set estimate while the bottom interval its 95%
confidence interval.
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